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determining the optimal balance between harmonization and diversity. In 
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Directive a company law directive or a capital markets directive?), 
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achievement of the Directive’s goal of facilitating takeovers and yielding a 
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focuses on the restrictions on frustrating action and the breakthrough rule. 
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TAKEOVER REGULATION: THROUGH THE 





As the Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing 
Corporate Governance in the European Union (2003) makes clear, the EU 
has sought to develop company and securities law as vital pillars of an 
overall attempt to improve Europe’s international competitiveness.1 An 
important part of this is the creation of an integrated capital market in the 
EU. The regulation of takeover bids was deemed to be a key element of 
such an integrated market.2 This paper will focus on Directive 2004/25/EC 
on Takeover Bids3 and will seek to examine it under the regulatory 
microscope. It is too early to make a complete judgment about the 
Directive’s effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism as this would involve 
determining whether it achieves its goals, secures high levels of 
compliance from Member States and market participants and is 
democratically accountable to the extent that its provisions affect the 
                                                 
* Law School, University College Dublin. 
1 Commission Communication. Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, COM/2003/0284 final. 
2 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids, p.18. 
3 This is the primary form of regulation of takeovers at EU level although clearly each of 
the Market Abuse, Prospectus and Transparency Directives will have implications for the 
regulation of takeovers. 
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public interest.4 It is however possible to reflect upon some of its potential 
strengths and failings in respect of these criteria.  
A number of factors must be identified at the outset which affect the shape 
of European takeover regulation. Firstly, each takeover is different 
because each company is different. Secondly, each market is different in 
terms of ownership patterns, structure and stage of development of the 
securities market, availability of finance, importance and role of the 
banking sector, socio-economic influences and political cultures. Thirdly, 
the regulation of takeovers falls within the remit of different types of 
bodies in different Member States each with their own particular 
structures, agendas, experiences and powers. Finally, takeover law in itself 
is not a coherent body of law in the way that one might describe 
constitutional or tort law. It has lots of different areas feeding into it such 
as company law, securities law, contract law and employment law. From a 
regulatory perspective thus it might be said to be more permeable, more 
open to external change than other areas of private law.5On the other hand, 
these differences have led to diverse treatment of takeovers in different 
Member States. A central regulatory problem thus is to determine the 
optimal balance between harmonization and diversity. 
In the 1970s, a view emerged in Europe that since takeovers had an overall 
positive economic effect, harmonised European legislation was required to 
facilitate takeovers and to provide a level playing field for takeover bids. 
Despite the introduction in 1985 of a White Paper on Completing the 
Internal Market which announced an intention to propose a directive on 
the approximation of Member States’ regulations governing takeovers, 
almost 20 years passed before a directive was actually adopted. During 
this time the Commission put forward one proposal after another, all of 
which failed to yield a consensus. The first proposal in 1989 involved a 
very detailed set of rules to be complied with by Member States. The 
second proposal in 1996 took the form of a framework directive setting 
                                                 
4 Regulating Law, Parker  C, Scott C, Lacey N, Braithwaite J (eds, Oxford, 2004) p.13. 
5 A similar argument was made by Dewar in relation to family law at p.82 of Regulating 
Law, Parker  C, Scott C, Lacey N, Braithwaite J (eds, Oxford, 2004). 
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out general principles governing takeovers bids but allowing Member 
States and competent authorities greater scope to deal with the detailed 
implementation of those principles. Still the process was beset with 
disagreement about the viability of self-regulatory supervisory authorities, 
the necessity of mandatory general bids, the treatment of employees 
during a bid and the possibility of defensive actions. In 2001, the 
Conciliation Committee actually reached a common agreed position6 but 
the text was rejected by the European Parliament on a tied vote. At that 
time, the Parliament identified for specific criticism the principle that 
shareholder approval was required before directors could institute 
defensive measures in the face of a bid. The Rapporteur, Klaus-Heiner 
Lehne, recommended that such a requirement could only be justified if a 
level playing field existed for European companies facing a takeover bid 
and that since this was not then the case the agreement should be rejected. 
The Parliament also argued that the protection for employees of 
companies involved in the bid was insufficient and that the proposal failed 
to achieve a level playing field with the United States. Following this 
setback, the Commission established a High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts under the chairmanship of Jap Winter to present 
recommendations for resolving the matters raised by Parliament. The 
ensuing report (“the Winter Report” was published in early 2002.7 A 
further proposal for a Directive was introduced in 2002 taking broad 
account of the Winter Report’s recommendations and following 
significant amendment, much of it last minute, a text was agreed.  
Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids (“the Directive”) was finally 
adopted in April 2004 with a required implementation date of 20 May 
2006.  
                                                 
6 [2001] OJ C23/1. 
7 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids (2002) 
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II. REGULATORY CHANGES 
When a directive was first considered, few European countries had 
detailed rules regulating takeovers. Levels of takeover activity varied 
dramatically from one Member State to another with the United Kingdom 
experiencing a substantially greater number of takeovers, particularly 
hostile takeovers, than other Member States.8 Consequently, the United 
Kingdom’s City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the City Code) was one 
of the first regulatory systems to be introduced in 1968. This self-
regulatory code, and the London Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the 
London Panel) which implements it, were created in response to public 
criticism of the tactics of bidders and targets in a number of prominent bid 
battles.9 Since then the London Panel has supervised over 7,000 
announced bids. It is clear that the London Panel’s experience and 
expertise has been harnessed by the Commission as many of the features 
of the Directive such as mandatory bids, the General Principles and the 
prohibition on frustrating tactics are modelled on the City Code. By 
contrast, many EU Member States had only recently adopted regulations 
governing takeovers. Indeed, many of the provisions in these more recent 
pieces of national legislation reflect responses to issues being debated in 
the context of the Directive. For example, Germany’s Takeover Act was 
introduced in 2002 and contained a mandatory bid rule. Prior to that time, 
Germany had been a staunch opponent of the inclusion of a mandatory bid 
rule in any Directive. This is consistent with the findings of Goergen et al 
that many countries have individually undertaken steps towards the 
convergence of takeover regulation.10 
                                                 
8 McCahery J, Renneboog L, Ritter P and Haller S, “The Economics of the Proposed 
European Takeover Directive” in Ferrarini G, Hopt K, Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds), 
Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford, 2004). 
9 Weinberg & Blank on Takeovers and Mergers (Sweet & Maxwell), Part III B at 
para.3.502. 
10 Goergen, Marc, Martynova, Marina and Renneboog, Luc, "Corporate Governance 
Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms" (April 2005). ECGI - Law 
Working Paper No. 33/2005 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=709023 or 
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.709023.  
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The substantial nature of the changes required to be made by Member 
States in order to implement the Directive varied from Member State to 
Member State. In Ireland, a statutory regime was already in place under 
the Irish Takeover Panel Act, 1997 which established the Irish Takeover 
Panel as the relevant supervisory authority for takeovers of Irish listed 
companies. (This role had been exercised until then by the London Panel. 
A decision was taken at the time of the split that despite the attractions of 
a self regulatory system, in order to ensure compliance with an Irish 
Panel’s takeover rules and enforcement of its rulings, statutory powers 
were required. 11) The Directive was implemented into Irish law by the 
European Communities (Takeover Bids (Directive 2004/25/EC)) 
Regulations 2006.12  
Somewhat ironically, the UK Government found itself faced with a 
complicated regulatory dilemma involving the London Panel. During the 
earlier stages of the drafting process, it was believed that the UK would be 
able to retain its self-regulatory system and thus references are made in the 
Directive to harmonising “arrangements” as well as regulations and 
codes.13 Recital 7 refers to self-regulatory bodies being able to exercise 
supervision. Article 4.1 expressly states that the authorities appointed by 
Member States to supervise bids may be public authorities, associations or 
private bodies recognised by national law or by public authorities 
expressly empowered for that purpose by national law. The UK 
Government expressly acknowledged the considerable strengths of the 
system of takeover regulation overseen by the Panel, including: flexibility, 
                                                 
11 Clarke,B “The Irish Takeover Panel Act, 1997 – A Further Cutting of the UK 
Regulatory Ties” (1998) 1 Palmer’s In Company 1-3. 
12 The Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2006 
subsequently introduced a number of amendments to the 1997 Act and the Regulations 
including a provision allowing the Irish Panel to make provision in its rules to give effect 
to EU law in this area. The power to make rules in the 1997 Act was not wide enough to 
enable the Panel to make rules directly to give effect to changes in this area arising from 
the Takeovers Directive and recent caselaw provides that such power must be provided in 
primary law. 
13 Article 1(1). 
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speed and certainty in decision-making; principles-based regulation; 
involvement of key City and business participants in developing takeover 
rules and the regulatory framework; and a consensual approach to 
regulation amongst those involved in the markets.14 It expressed the wish 
to preserve these core characteristics of takeover regulation. However, 
under Community law, the provisions of the Directive had to be 
implemented by rules which have legally binding effect in some way.15 
There was considerable legal uncertainty as to whether recognition of a 
non-statutory Code as applied by a non-statutory body even with the back-
up of the Listing Rules or other statutory support would constitute proper 
implementation of the Directive. The UK Government thus decided to 
provide statutory underpinning to the regulatory activities of the London 
Panel while seeking to give it considerable scope to decide its internal 
structures and operational framework.16 The City Code was given statutory 
effect in the Takeovers Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulations 
2006 and subsequently the Companies Act 2006. The London Panel was 
given a number of statutory powers enabling it to make and enforce rules 
in relation to takeover regulation.  Interestingly, the London Panel 
indicated that in giving its rulings, it continues to have the ability to 
interpret the City Code flexibly to take account of the particular 
circumstances of the case and that the Executive remains able to respond 
to such enquiries speedily.17 Indeed, it has opined that the implementation 
of the Directive will have little impact in practice on the Executive’s day-
to-day operations.18 Despite the attempts in the Directive to imbue 
                                                 
14 DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids, A 
Consultative Document (January 2005) para.2.11. 
15 DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids, A 
Consultative Document (January 2005) para.2.12. 
16 DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids, 
Government Response and Summary of Responses to the Consultative Document 
(November 2005) p.3. 
17 The Takeover Panel, The European Directive on Takeover Bids (2005/10) (January 
2005) p 2. 
18 Takeover Panel 2006 Annual Report. 
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Member States with as much flexibility as possible by setting out merely 
the regulatory framework (described in the next section below), it is 
submitted that this may be a sanguine view. The London Panel has always 
had the benefit of applying the principle that the spirit as well as, or in 
some cases rather than, the letter of the law must be applied. Despite being 
subject to judicial review19 and falling within the scope of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, the London Panel has not yet experienced the restrictions 
which by definition must apply to a statutory code. It remains to be seen 
the extent to which this impedes its operation. 
 
III. FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE 
The Directive takes the form of a framework of six general principles with 
which Member States must ensure compliance. The Directive then sets out 
a number of general requirements which Member States will have to 
respect through detailed implementing rules. (This is consistent with the 
Lamfalussey Report on the Regulation of Securities Markets.20) However, 
even these provisions of the Directive must be seen merely as minimum 
requirements for EU takeover regulation as Article 3(2) expressly 
authorises Member States to lay down additional conditions and 
provisions more onerous than those of the Directive for the regulation of 
bids.  
Recital 6 expressly states that “in order to be effective, takeover regulation 
should be flexible and capable of dealing with new circumstances as they 
arise”. It states that it should accordingly provide for the possibility of 
exceptions and derogations. Article 4(5) thus allows Member States to 
provide in the rules introduced pursuant to the Directive for derogations 
                                                 
19 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc and another (Norton Opax 
plc and another intervening) [1987] 1 All ER 564. 
20 The Committee of Wise Men Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets 
(2001) http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm 
viewed 9th January 2006. The Committee was chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy. 
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from the rules. This power is not however absolute. Firstly, Article 4(5) 
clearly states that they may only do so where the general principles are 
respected. Secondly, the right to derogate must be provided for in the rules 
Member States introduce or make21 and not merely granted by the 
supervisory authorities on an ad hoc basis. What remains somewhat of a 
moot point is whether derogations can be granted from the general 
requirements which are set out in the Directive once to do so would not be 
contrary to the general principles.  
Although the rationale for harmonising only the basic principles is 
obvious, one predictable and intended consequence is that that takeover 
regulation will be different in each Member State. Thus for example the 
Directive does not define “control” and it is up to each Member State to 
state the particular percentage figure. This takes into account differences 
in share ownerships structures among Member States. The optionality 
provisions referred to in section VI below serve to exacerbate these 
regulatory differences. A further and unintended contribution was made to 
this regulatory diversity by the drafting process itself. In many areas of the 
Directive, Member States are left to attempt to make sense of opaque 
provisions or inconsistent provisions. This means that the Directive is 
likely to be implemented and construed differently in each Member State, 
i.e. according to local legal culture and consistently with prior corporate 
law provisions. There are numerous examples of this. One such example is 
the requirement to make a mandatory bid which is triggered where a 
person as a result of his/her own acquisition or the acquisition of a concert 
party acquires control in the company. Article 5(1) requires that “such a 
person” must make a bid without specifying which person. In Ireland and 
the UK, the pre-existing mandatory bid provision allowed the Panels to 
determine which of the parties should make the bid and this practice has 
been continued.22 While this provision was maintained in Ireland and the 
                                                 
21 Article 4(4) provides that Member States may (i) include such derogations in their 
national rules, in order to take account of circumstances determined at national level 
and/or (ii) grant their competent supervisory authorities powers to waive such national 
rules, to take account of the circumstances referred to in (i) or in other specific 
circumstances, in which case a reasoned decision must be required. 
22 Rule 9 of the City Code and the Irish Takeover Panel Takeover Rules 2001-2006. 
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UK, different Member States may not follow suit. Furthermore, an 
argument could be made that this does not meet the requirements of the 
Directive as the obligation is not shared between the parties. Such lack of 
clarity can lead to litigation – often of a tactical nature.    
 
IV. CLASSIFICATION 
Is the Directive a company law directive or a capital markets directive? 
Formally it is a directive on company law and part of the company law 
harmonization process. It started life as the draft 13th Company Law 
Directive. It deals with company issues such as squeeze out rule and 
restrictions on frustrating actions. However, it also seeks to regulate the 
information avail to investors making the investment decision to retain 
their shares in the company or to sell – a capital markets issue. The 
Directive also deals with issues which might be said to be neither 
company law or capital markets law such as the provision in Article 6 of 
consultation rights to employees. Finally, the Directive deals with issues 
with both a company law and a capital markets law dimension. For 
example empirical studies indicate that corporate governance is becoming 
increasingly important to investors in making their investment decisions.23 
Similarly, the SOX legislation in the US indicates that more stringent 
corporate governance obligations may often be the capital market 
regulatory response to perceived deficiencies.24 Why is this classification 
relevant? Although closely linked, capital markets regulation and takeover 
regulation serves different objectives.25 For example, disclosure regulation 
                                                 
23 See for example McKinsey’s Global Investor Opinion Survey, 2002 or Gompers, P, 
Ishii J and Metrick, A. “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices.” 118 Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (2003) 107. 
24 “EU Company Law at the Crossroads” at p.12 in Reforming Company and Takeover 
Law in Europe (Ferrarrini,G Hopt, K Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds) (Oxford 
University Press, 2004).   
25 “EU Company Law at the Crossroads” at p.12 in Reforming Company and Takeover 
Law in Europe (Ferrarrini,G Hopt, K Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds) (Oxford 
University Press, 2004).   
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in company law tends to be viewed as an instrument of corporate 
governance ensuring that the board is held accountable and allowing their 
performance be assessed. It also determines the extent to which a company 
can make distributions to shareholders under the capital maintenance 
rules. By contrast, disclosure regulations in capital markets law is 
designed to ensure the protection of investors by providing them with 
sufficient and timely information and the promotion of an efficient and 
orderly marketplace. The idea is that by placing a more liquid and efficient 
capital market at the service of EU, enterprise will deliver benefits in 
terms of competitiveness, and job creation, innovation and growth.26 From 
a regulatory perspective, both types of law makes different jurisdictional 
claims. The company law of a Member State regulates the governance of 
companies incorporated and with their registered offices in the State. 
Capital markets law of a Member State applies to companies whose 
securities are listed on that State’s markets.  
Article 4.2(a) of the Directive provides that the supervisory authority 
having jurisdiction to regulate a bid is that of the Member State in which 
the offeree company has its registered office (its “home Member State”) if 
the securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in that Member 
State. In this case, only one supervisory authority has jurisdiction and the 
law of that Member State clearly applies to all aspects of the bid. This 
provision is likely to apply to the vast majority of companies caught by the 
Directive as only a few companies avoid listing in their country of 
incorporation. However, where this situation does arise and a company’s 
securities are not listed in its home Member State, paragraphs (b) to (e) of 
Article 4.2 apply and matters become a good deal more complicated. If the 
securities are traded on a regulated market in another Member State, the 
competent authority will be that of that Member State. If the securities are 
admitted to trading on more than one market, the competent authority will 
be that of the Member State on the regulated market of which the 
securities were first admitted to trading. If the securities were listed 
simultaneously, the offeree company is given the option of determining 
which of the Member State’s supervisory authorities will have jurisdiction 
and of notifying the regulated market and supervisory authority on the first 
                                                 
26 Report of Sixth meeting of the Financial Service Policy Group (11/02 2000) available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/actionplan/index_en.htm#policy. 
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day of trading. Where its securities are already trading prior to the 
implementation of the Directive, the decision is left to the supervisory 
authorities. However, in all these cases where the offeree’s securities are 
not listed in its home Member State, paragraph (e) provides that 
jurisdiction must be divided. Procedural matters which specifically include 
the price, the information on the offeror’s decision to make a bid, the 
contents of the offer document and disclosure of the bid are to be dealt 
with in accordance with the rules of the competent authority’s Member 
State. By contrast, both the applicable rules and the competent authority 
shall be those of the home Member State for matters relating to 
information for employees and company law matters (specifically, the 
percentage of voting rights conferring control, derogations from the 
mandatory bid and conditions under which defensive actions may be 
allowed). Much discussion has revolved around the manner of 
implementation of paragraph (e). At one stage during the drafting process, 
there were demands for a definitive and exhaustive list within the 
Directive of issues falling within each category. Subsequently, it seemed 
as if this article might usefully be the subject of Level 2 implementing 
measures under the Lamfalussy system. It is now clear that it will be up to 
the supervisory authorities in each Member State to agree to a separation 
of responsibilities. Two problems exist with this. First, the authorities may 
not agree. Second, even if they do, the relevant parties may not accept 
what is in fact merely an interpretation of the Directive. The Directive 
does not provide a means for resolving such disputes. It merely requires 
the supervisory authorities of Member States to “cooperate”. It will thus 
fall to the European Court of Justice to do so. All of this will involve time 
and delay. This may jeopardise what has been recognised as “the special 
needs of the financial markets for speed on the part of decision-makers”.27 
It may even encourage tactical litigation. In a hostile takeover bid, one of 
the parties may argue that a particular issue, for example a minimum 
acceptance condition, has been incorrectly classified. Although as noted 
above, paragraph (e) will not apply to the vast majority of Directive 
companies at present, concerns have been raised that as European stock 
                                                 
27 R V Panel on Takeovers and Mergers; Ex Parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815.  
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exchanges merge and new electronic markets are developed, the number 
of companies affected by this provision may grow.28  
 
V.   PUBLIC INTEREST 
In the light of available economic evidence, the Winter Group opined that 
the availability of a mechanism which facilitates takeover bids is basically 
beneficial.29 It cited three reasons for this: the exploitation of synergies, 
the opportunity to sell at a premium on market price and finally, the 
market for corporate control. The latter suggests that takeovers or the 
threat of takeovers act as a stimulant to encourage directors to adopt an 
optimal governance structure.30 Though beyond the scope of this paper, it 
is submitted that the market for corporate control as a form of external 
market force suffers from its reliance on a number of disputable 
assumptions, limited application and ambiguous empirical support.31 
However, the Winter Report was emphatic in its assertion that “such 
discipline of management and reallocation of resources is in the long term 
                                                 
28 DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids, 
Government Response and Summary of Responses to the Consultative Document 
(November 2005) p31. 
29 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids (2002) p.19. 
30 Manne H (1965) “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.” 73 Journal of 
Political Economics 110, Jensen M and Meckling W “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305 and Fama E “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980)  88 
Journal of Political Economics 288. 
31 See further Clarke B “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the 
Market for Corporate Control” (2006) Journal of Business Law 355-374. 
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in the best interests of all stakeholders and society at large” and that these 
views “form the basis for the Directive”.32  
Prior to the introduction of the Directive in Ireland, the evidence supported 
the idea that takeovers were based on the creation of synergies and that 
offeree shareholders received premiums but the evidence in support of the 
market for corporate control was weaker. A study was undertaken by the 
author of all 35 companies subjected to a takeover offer since the 
inception of the Irish Takeover Panel in 1997.33 Of the documents studied, 
49% involved bids from established companies in the same industries, 
36% involved bids by MBO vehicles and a further 15% involved bids by 
newly established companies run by individuals often with experience in 
these areas. Synergistic gains were stated to be the reason behind the 
acquisitions from companies in the same industry. In particular, the 
opportunity to expand in the Irish markets was emphasised. Interestingly, 
all the cross-border bids in the sample (28%) fell into this category.  In 
terms of premiums, the average recorded for the bids was 33%.34 This is 
clearly attractive for the offeree’s shareholders. It also explains perhaps 
why all but one of the companies in the sample experienced a change in 
control following the bid. Finally, the evidence sheds some light on the 
health of the market for corporate control in Ireland. On a general level, 
only 5% of relevant companies were subjected to a bid in any one 
year.35In considering which specific bids might be the result of inefficient 
                                                 
32 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids (2002) p.19. 
33 The study was based on the offer documents and response circulars of the 39 takeover 
offers made from 1997 to 2006.  
34 This does not include offers where there was no actual value for the share listing - 
because of a lack of a market, suspension or otherwise.  
35 The average number of relevant companies during the period 1997 to 2005 was 74. The 
term “relevant company” is determined in accordance with section 2 of the Irish 
Takeover Panel Act 1997. 
 
 
14                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 05 
management, the MBO situations would not appear relevant.36 These bids 
were stated to be driven overwhelmingly by perceptions of negative small 
cap sentiments in the Irish market. Of the acquisitions from offerors in the 
same industry which disclosed these details37, only one involved all the 
offeree’s directors resigning and the remaining bids retained the CEO 
and/or at least half the board. Of the six bids from new offeror companies 
in the sample, one retained the CEO and finance director, four did not 
disclose whether any of the directors were resigning and only one declared 
that all directors were resigning. None of these companies cited poor 
management as the rational for the acquisition. However, before using this 
as evidence to question the existence of the market for corporate control, 
one must remember that the effect of the market for corporate control lies 
as much in the threat it poses to directors as the production of changes in 
control. It is arguable thus that where the threat operates effectively, there 
would not be high incidents of takeovers. All that one might conclude 
from the survey thus is that there does not seem to be substantial evidence 
of the stick being used. 
While it is clearly in the public interest that the Directive operates 
effectively in order to achieve the positive economic effect referred to 
above, there is a specific group of stakeholders which is worth considering 
separately – employees. Traditionally in Ireland and the UK, takeover 
regulation has involved considering the interests of shareholders almost 
exclusively amongst other stakeholders. The Takeover Rules referred to 
employees only to the extent of requiring the offeror to include a statement 
in the offer document indicating: its intentions regarding the continuation 
of the business of the offeree and its subsidiaries; its intentions regarding 
any major changes to be introduced in the business, including any 
redeployment of the fixed assets of the target and its subsidiaries; the long-
term commercial justification of the offer; and its intentions with regard to 
                                                 
36 Even if the poor share price was caused by inept management, it would seem to pervert 
the market for corporate control theory, if the management themselves were able to 
benefit from the fruits of their ineptitude. 
37 6 out of the 19 bids did not disclose any details of the resignations. A further one 
indicated the finance director and an undisclosed number of other directors were 
remaining. 
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the continued employment of the employees of the offeree and of its 
subsidiaries.38 In practice, this was satisfied by the inclusion of a boiler-
plate statement to the effect that the employees existing contractual rights 
would be respected. Given that this constituted an existing legal 
requirement, this was not particularly significant. However, the 
continental European idea of corporate social responsibility and the 
treatment of employee stakeholders embedded in many of the Member 
States political economies would have envisaged a greater role for 
employees in the takeover process. Consistent with this, the earlier drafts 
of General Principle 3(2)(c) in the Directive imposed a duty on the board 
of the offeree “to act in all the interests of the company, including 
employment”.  The wider and more inclusive form of corporate social 
responsibility promulgated in the US never appeared even to reach the 
discussion stages in respect of a European Directive. 
The issue of employees constitutes a clear example of the challenges faced 
by the Commission attempting to find a common path in the field of 
takeover regulation.  The UK and Ireland expressed concern at the express 
reference to employees in the general principles. These concerns did not 
stem merely from an unwillingness to compromise positions or parochial 
bias. In the common law jurisdictions, genuine legal uncertainty 
surrounded the imposition of a duty on directors to act in the interests of 
employees. Concern was expressed that this duty might be difficult to 
respect where a conflict arose between the interests of the shareholders 
and the interests of the employees.39 Such a conflict would arise for 
example where a generous offer had been made to shareholders but in 
circumstances where the offeror made clear its intention to dismiss a large 
portion of the workforce following the acquisition. At the Working 
Council Group examining the draft Directive, the argument was made that 
in Ireland and the UK, where directors were under an existing fiduciary 
duty to act in the interests of the company, this could cause difficulties as 
it might be seen as an extension of the fiduciary duties. It was argued 
                                                 
38 Rule 24.1. 
39 The Company and Commercial Law Committee of the Law Society of Ireland made 
this point for example in their submission to the Commission on the draft directive. 
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furthermore that the Directive is charged with protecting shareholders. 
This argument was accepted and the final version of the General Principle 
3(2)(c) omitted the express reference to employees and refers merely to 
requiring the offeree board to act “in the interests of the company as a 
whole”.   
General Principle 3(2)(c) appears at first glance to amount to a restating of 
the traditional common law fiduciary duty. In itself, this would be an 
unusual consequence because one of the criticisms often leveled against 
EU corporate regulation is that it does not cover core corporate law areas 
such as fiduciary duties and shareholder remedies.40 However, the 
meaning of the term “company as a whole” remains somewhat ambiguous. 
In the common law jurisdictions the term “acting in the interests of the 
company” in the context of fiduciary duties has typically been viewed as 
acting in the interests of shareholders.41 The term in the Directive is 
clearly open to different interpretations and yet none is provided. The 
recitals are not helpful in this regard. While the first recital refers to the 
necessity to coordinate safeguards required by Member States “for the 
protection of the interests of members and others”, the other recitals refer 
only to shareholders. Rather than defining the term, Ireland and the UK 
have imported the provision directly into the implementing rules. (While, 
the London Panel’s Code Committee considers that the Panel’s primary 
focus in considering breaches of the Code is and will continue to be the 
consequences for shareholders, “on reflection” it noted that breaches of 
the Code may also have consequences for other people.42) The lack of a 
clear meaning for this term may give rise to difficulties for companies 
seeking to comply with this general principle and for Member States eager 
to ensure compliance.  
                                                 
40 Enriques L.“EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?”  
Law Working Paper N° 39/2005 (May 2005). 
41 Clarke B, “Regulating Poison Pill Devices” (2004) 4 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
51-75. 
42 RS2005/5, Panel Response Statement, 21/04/2006, The implementation of the 
Takeovers Directive, p.15. 
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A further potential difficulty with the inclusion of this term in the general 
principles is that it is not clear whether it gives rise to directly enforceable 
rights. While pre-existing companies legislation in the UK and Ireland 
acknowledges the duty of directors to act in the interests of employees, the 
duty is expressly stated to be owed to the company and enforceable only 
by the company.43 However, the Directive imposes an obligation on 
Member States to ensure compliance with this general principle without 
such a limitation. One might question thus whether the existence of a 
general principle in the takeover rules, a narrow statutory duty and a 
restrictively interpreted common law duty in Ireland and the UK is 
sufficient to ensure compliance with the Directive. From an academic 
perspective, one might also consider the effect of such a broad and 
unrestricted duty as that included in the Directive on the existing common 
law position. Could this perhaps give rise to one of the “collisions” 44 
Black describes where the regulatory provisions have direct and unsettling 
effect on common law calling into question traditional common law 
conceptualisations. 
In addition to the General Principle, certain other provisions in the 
Directive provides rights to employees. However, these rights constitute 
rights to information and to consultation only. So for example, Article 
6(3)(i) provides that the offeror must include in the offer document “the 
offeror’s intentions with regard to the future business of the offeree 
company and, in so far as it is affected by the bid, the offeror company 
and with regard to the safeguarding of the jobs of their employees and 
management, including any material change in the conditions of 
employment, and in particular the offeror’s strategic plans for the two 
companies and the likely repercussions on employment and the locations 
of the companies’ place of business”. Article 9(5) requires the board of the 
                                                 
43 In some cases such as Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch. 286, Evershed 
MR suggested that the interests of the present shareholders should be considered. In 
Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health [1972] Ch. 317 and Dawson 
International plc v Coats Paton plc (1988) 4 B.C.C. 305 the interests of the company were 
equated with the interests of present and future shareholders. 
44 Black J. “The Case of Finance” at p.41 in Regulating Law, Parker  C, Scott C, Lacey 
N, Braithwaite J (eds, Oxford, 2004). 
 
 
18                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 05 
offeree company to set out its views on the effects of the implementation 
of the bid on all the company’s interests and specifically employment, and 
on the offeror’s strategic plans for the offeree and the likely repercussions 
on employment and the locations of the companies’ place of business as 
set out in the offer document”. The Winter Report noted that such 
provisions were adequate and that any further concerns for the interests of 
employees should be addressed by specific legislation providing for 
information and consultation of employees and for their protection in the 
event of a bid leading to restructuring.45 Limited though that are, even 
these disclosure requirements might be difficult to comply with in all 
cases. For example in a hostile bid, the offeror may not have access to 
sufficient information to allow it make any meaningful proposals. 
Similarly, the offeree board are unlikely to be aware of any substantive 
plans. Such difficulties arose in the hostile bid by Ryanair for Aer Lingus 
in 2006.  
 
VI. HARMONISATION AND THE CREATION OF A LEVEL 
PLAYING FIELD 
One of the most controversial aspects of the harmonization process in the 
takeover market in the EU has been the creation of a level playing field. 
Because of the aforementioned structural and regulatory differences 
between the various Member States, it was acknowledged that takeover 
bids could not be undertaken with the same expectation of success in 
different Member States.46 Thus shareholders in Member Sates did not 
have equivalent opportunities to tender their shares. This is referred to as 
the ‘lack of a level playing field’. The Winter Committee was set the task 
of reviewing whether and to what extent a level playing field for takeover 
bids could and should be created with respect to the mechanisms and 
                                                 
45 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids (2002) p.16. 
46 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids (2002) p.19. 
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structures, allowed and created under company law in Member States, 
which may frustrate or inhibit takeover bids. The Committee 
acknowledged at the outset that any approach on this basis would leave the 
various general and structural differences existing in Member States 
untouched. However it expressed the opinion that its recommendations 
with respect to company law mechanisms and structures would, in 
addition to market driven changes, mark an important step forward in 
developing a general level playing field for takeover bids in the EU.47 The 
Report firmly acknowledged that there was a need for a level playing field 
for shareholders in the EU and that a directive on takeover bids was an 
important part of it. 
As a consequence of its deliberations, the Winter Report suggested that a 
guiding principle of any European company law regulation aimed at 
creating a level playing field should be the right of shareholders to make 
the ultimate decision in respect of whether to tender their shares and at 
what price. It concluded that the risk was too great that their own self-
interests would lead directors would engage in actions which would 
frustrate hostile takeovers.48This view was accepted by the EU legislature 
and Article 3(1)(c) provides inter alia that “the board of an offeree 
company … must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to 
decide on the merits of the bid”. Article 9(2), giving effect to this 
principle, requires the specific prior authorisation of shareholders for “any 
action ...which may result in the frustration of the bid other than seeking 
alternative bids”49 and specifically “before issuing any shares” at least 
from the time the offeree is approached. Article 9(3) introduces a 
requirement for shareholder approval of “decisions taken … and not yet 
partly or fully implemented” before the beginning of the period during 
                                                 
47 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids (2002) p.20. 
48 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids (2002) p 21. 
49 Such an exemption is also consistent with practice in Ireland and the UK. Indeed in 
two of the three hostile bids made to Irish companies during the period of study, this was 
the successful form of defence utilised by management. 
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which Rule 9(2) applies where the decisions do not form part of the 
normal course of the company’s business and where their implementation 
“may result in the frustration of the bid”. The prohibition applies to all 
decisions which have a chance of frustrating the bid. This appears 
extremely far reaching until one considers that Art 9(3) expressly excludes 
“decisions” which have been “partly or fully implemented”. Transposing 
this particular provision was challenging as no guidance was given as to 
what constitutes a “decision” or how one might be partly implemented.50 
The difficulty was avoided in the UK and Ireland by the repetition of the 
same wording in the Takeover Rules without the benefit of explanatory 
notes. This may give rise problems at a later stage when the provision is 
tested.   
The Winter Report also stated that European company law regulation 
aimed at creating a level playing field should be guided by a second 
principle – proportionality between risk-bearing and control.51 Article 11 
introduces the break-through rule which was designed to increase the 
number of takeovers in the EU by eliminating these corporate governance 
arrangements which might otherwise impede takeovers.52  The Winter 
Report argued that the presence of differentiated voting rights, voting 
caps, pyramid structures and other such structures in Member States’ 
company law was generally inconsistent with the principles of shareholder 
decision making and proportionality between risk-bearing capital and 
control. The rule’s desired effect thus was to transform a bid on a 
company where there is one dominant blockholder into a bid for a 
company with dispersed ownership. It allows the bidder thus to acquire 
control without necessarily persuading the dominant blockholder to sell. 
Article 11(2) and (3) dis-apply certain restrictions when a bid has been 
                                                 
50 Clarke B, “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the Market for 
Corporate Control” (2006) Journal of Business Law 355-374. 
51 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids, p.20. 
52 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids, p 29.  
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made public. During the acceptance period, Art 11(2) dis-applies vis a vis 
the offeror restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in the 
articles of association of the offeree and restrictions on the transfer of 
securities in contracts between the offeree and its shareholders or between 
shareholders entered after the adoption of the Directive. Article 11(3) 
provides that restrictions on voting rights provided for in the articles of 
association of the offeree and restrictions on voting rights in contracts 
between the offeree and its shareholders or between shareholders who 
entered after the adoption of the Directive shall not have effect at the 
general meeting of shareholders “deciding on any defensive measures” in 
accordance with Art 9. In addition, Art 11(3) provides that multiple-vote 
securities will carry one vote each at the general meeting of shareholders 
which “decides on any defensive measures” in accordance with Art 9. 
Article 11(4) provides that where following a bid, the offeror holds 75% 
or more of the capital carrying voting rights, none of the above restrictions 
and none of the “extraordinary rights” of shareholders in the articles of 
association concerning the appointment/removal of board members shall 
apply. Furthermore, multiple-vote securities will carry one vote each at the 
first general meeting of shareholders following closure of the bid, called 
by the offeror to amend the articles or appoint/remove directors. The 
offeror is entitled to call such a meeting on short notice once at least two 
weeks notice is given. Article 11(6) and (7) provides an exception to the 
application of Art 11(3) and (4) if the restriction on voting rights is 
compensated for by specific pecuniary advantages” or if the rights are held 
by Member States. The Winter Report noted that the application of such a 
rule after a successful bid was designed to:  
strike a balance between, on the one hand, the need, at least for 
the time being, to allow differences in the capital and control 
structures of companies in view of the current differences 
between Member States, and on the other hand, the need to 
allow and stimulate successful takeover bids to take place in 
order to create an integrated securities market in Europe.53  
                                                 
53 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids, p 30.  
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As a consequence of the rule, a blockholder who wishes to retain control 
must thus compete for the company. In the event that financing is 
available thus, the party with the higher valuation will prevail. While 
Berglöf and Burkart thus argued that, in the absence of wealth constrains, 
the breakthrough rule ensures an efficient allocation of corporate control,54 
this view is not without its critics.55 It should be noted that it is possible 
that companies could avoid the rule by increasing ownership to more than 
25% or reincorporating outside the EU. Alternatively they could introduce 
structures outside the scope of the rule such as cross-holdings or pyramids. 
Finally, implementing the rule may cause difficulties as a result of the 
requirement in the Directive to provide compensation in certain cases.56 
This may even allow the rule to be used in order to render takeovers more 
unattractive.  
In the debates on the Directive in the European Parliament in 2001, the 
argument was made that the introduction of a prohibition on frustrating 
action would create an unlevel playing field between the EU and the 
United States. The Winter Report acknowledged that boards of American 
companies generally have a broad discretion to put up defensive devices 
under the business judgement rule and that many individual states have 
                                                 
54 Berglöf E and Burkart M, “European Takeover Regulation” (2003) 18 Economic 
Policy 171. 
55 Gugler K, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance (Oxford University 
Press, 2001), Bennesden M and Nielsen K, “The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on 
European Firms” (Working Paper, Copenhagen Business School, 2002, Khachaturyan A, 
“Can Bolkestein Finally Break the Takeover Directive Deadlock?” (Commentary, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, 12 January 2005), 
http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=68 viewed 9 January 2006, DTI, Company 
Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids, Government Response 
and Summary of Responses to the Consultative Document (November 2005) n 19, p 25, 
Hertig G and McCahery J “Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided 
Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition” (2003) 4 European Business 
Organization Law Review 179 and Bebchuk L and Hart O, “A threat to Dual-class 
Shares”, Financial Times (31 May 2002). 
56 B. Clarke, “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the Market for 
Corporate Control” (2006) Journal of Business Law 355-374. 
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enacted laws specifically permitting the board to consider other interests 
than shareholders’ interests. However, it strongly argued that the 
American approach was likely to be less beneficial to the development of 
efficient integrated capital markets in Europe. It cited three arguments to 
support this view. Firstly, while American companies generally have a 
broad discretion to defend themselves under the business judgment rule, it 
argued that this discretion operates in a widely differing legal and capital 
market environment. It suggested that American boards are subject to 
greater pressure than their European counterparts to enhance shareholder 
value. This pressure comes from non-executive directors on the board, 
investment banks and advisors and in particular from institutional 
investors. Board behaviour is widely transparent under the legal 
transparency rules and the intense scrutiny of the media. In addition, proxy 
contests are more likely to ensue and liability suits against directors are 
more common as derivative actions are easier and the judicial system is 
better equipped. Secondly, the Winter Report noted while the relatively 
broad discretion of the board to defend against takeover bids has certainly 
led to a number of takeover bids not being successful or not being made at 
all, takeover activity in the American capital markets is intensive and 
forms an essential part of its financial and economical structure. It noted 
that European companies have benefited from this and evidence gathered 
on mergers and acquisitions activity between 1990 and 2000 indicates that 
the existence of defensive mechanisms have not deterred European 
companies. By contrast, the existence of barriers in some Member States 
has resulted in control over listed companies being incontestable. The 
Winter Report concluded that this is undesirable in the European context, 
as an integrated capital market has to be build up in order for business to 
fully benefit from and make effective use of the integrating internal 
market in Europe. Thirdly, the Winter Report noted that certain defensive 
measures in the US are prompted by the ability of bidders to obtain control 
through the making of a partial bid. Such bids are not possible under the 
mandatory bid provision in the Directive. Finally, it noted that anti-
takeover rules are controversial even within the United States and that 
while some accept them as the outcome of regulatory competition among 
the states and effective lobbying by the business community, there is a 
large body of both economic and legal literature arguing that they should 
be prohibited.  The Winter Report argued that it was not desirable that the 
American approach to defensive actions be followed in Europe but rather 
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a system of regulation which is the best suited to its environment and 
objectives.57  
Article 12(1) provides that Member States may decide not to require 
companies registered in their jurisdiction to apply the prohibition on 
frustrating action in Article 9 and the break-through rule in Article 11. 
Article 12(2) provides that if Member States “make use of this option” 
they must still grant companies the reversible option of applying the 
Articles.58 One view is that as a consequence of Article 12(1), the 
harmonisation process has been damaged and the goals of the Directive 
undermined. An alternative view set out below is that competition is 
preferable to harmonisation in this regard. Before dealing with this issue 
however, one must consider a more straightforward threat to the creation 
of a level playing field and one which is not dealt with by the Directive as 
a result of regulatory gaps in this area – the frustration of bids through 
persuasion by potentially conflicted offeree directors.  
 
VII. REGULATORY GAPS  
A further defence available to the offeree board is that of dissuading the 
offeree’s shareholders from accepting the offer. In the Irish survey, this 
was the successful form of defence utilised by management in the third 
hostile bid. Indeed, it is very telling to note that in all cases in the Irish 
study, shareholders followed the advice of their directors. This is 
consistent with international empirical studies which have consistently 
found that the recommendations of target company directors in takeovers 
is the most important variable in determining takeover outcome.59 This 
                                                 
57 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids, p.39-42 
58 This decision must be taken by the shareholders in a general meeting in 
accordance with the rules applicable to the amendment of their articles of association.  
59 O’Sullivan, N and Wong, P. “Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Hostile 
Takeovers: Some UK Evidence” (1999) 29 Accounting and Business Research 139-155, 
Cotter, J.S., Shivdasani, A. and Zenner, M. “Do Independent Directors Enhance Target 
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increases the urgency of ensuring that effective corporate governance 
mechanisms exist to regulate the process of making these 
recommendations in order to ensure that directors are acting in the best 
interests of the company and its shareholders. However a mixture of 
binding “hard law” and non-binding “soft law” regulates the process of 
making these recommendations.  
The Winter Report advised that the offeree board’s insight into, and 
responsibility for, the strategy and day-to-day affairs of the company 
enable and require it to advise the shareholders on the takeover bid. It thus 
opined that the board is best placed “to express its views on the 
consequences of the bid for the company and its business and on the 
attractiveness of the terms of the bid for the shareholders”.60 Consistent 
with this view, Article 9(5) of the Directive obliges the offeree board to 
draw up and make public a document setting out its opinion of the bid and 
the reasons on which it is based. However, absolutely no reference is made 
to the composition of the board giving such advice. There is no 
requirement, for example for directors with a particular conflict of interest 
to stand down. The General Principles merely require that the board of the 
offeree “act in the interest of the company as a whole”.61 While this duty 
clearly applies to the giving of advice to shareholders, as noted above in 
section V, its implementation casts serious doubts on its usefulness in this 
regard. The Higgs Report acknowledged the “natural potential for conflict 
                                                                                                                         
Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?”(1997) 39 Journal of Financial Economics 3-
43, Holl, P. and Kyriazis, D. “The Determinants of Outcome in UK Takeover Bids”  
(1996) 3 International Journal of Economics and Business 165-184, Cotter, JS. And 
Zenner, M. “How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process” (1994) 35 
Journal of Financial Economics 63-97, Eddey, PH. And Casey, RS. “Directors 
Recommendations in Response to Takeover Bids: Do They Act in their Own Interests” 
(1989) 14 Australian Journal of Management 1-28 and Walking, R. “Predicting Tender 
Offer Success: A Logistic Analysis” (1985) 20 Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 461-478. 
60 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids, p 20. 
61 Article 3(2)(c). 
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between the interests of executive management and shareholders” in the 
making of a range of routine decisions such as remuneration or audit.62 In 
such circumstances, the Report noted that the legal duty on directors to act 
in the best interests of the company in itself is “insufficient to give full 
assurance that these potential conflicts will not impair objective board 
decision-making”.63 Yet, in the more extreme circumstance of a takeover 
bid, only this duty is prescribed by the Directive. It is submitted thus that 
by failing to regulate this crucial area of corporate governance, the 
Directive is failing in its objective to protect fully the interests of 
shareholder and to create a level playing field. 
This area is not regulated by existing corporate governance rules. At the 
European level, both a Commission sponsored  review of the main 
corporate governance codes relevant to the EU64 and the High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts in its final report65 advised against 
establishing an EU corporate governance code. The latter report noted that 
while fixed rules in primary legislation may offer “the benefits of 
certainty, democratic legitimacy and strong possibilities of enforcement” 
this comes at “the cost of little or no flexibility, and disability to keep pace 
with changing circumstances.” It specifically recommended making use of 
alternative forms of regulation including “soft law” in the corporate 
governance area. In the 2003 Action Plan, the Commission agreed that 
there was no need for an EU corporate governance code. It did however 
emphasise the need for any regulatory response at European Union level 
to be firm in the principles as well as flexible in application. As part of this 
                                                 
62 Higgs, D. Review of the Role and Effectiviness of Non-Executive Directors (January 
2003), para.9.2. 
63 Higgs, D  Review of the Role and Effectiviness of Non-Executive Directors (January 
2003), para.9.3. 
64 Comparative Study of the Corporate Governance Codes relevant to the European 
Union and its Member States : http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/ 
en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt_en.htm 
65Final Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (4/11/2002). 
2007] TAKEOVER REGULATION 27 
 
 
process, a recommendation on non-executive directors was planned which 
considered the nature of board independence. By using a non-binding 
instrument, it was intended that Member States would develop their 
regulatory environment along similar lines rather than agreeing a single 
detailed solution – the process of convergence would thus be flexible.66 
The EU Consultation Paper on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory 
Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the 
(Supervisory) Board in 2004 explained that precise definitions of 
“independence” vary in different codes and there is an absence of “a 
universal understanding of what independence precisely entails”.67 
Similarly, the Recitals to the Recommendation on the Role of Non-
Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the 
Committees of the (Supervisory) Board in 2005 note that “in view of the 
complexity of many of the issues at stake, the adoption of detailed binding 
rules is not necessarily the most desirable and efficient way of achieving 
the objectives pursued.”68 Like other forms of soft law, this leads to 
criticism that it lacks the clarity and precision needed to provide 
predictability and a reliable framework for action.69   
In the absence of an EU corporate governance code, each Member State 
deals with this unilaterally. The Combined Code (2006) applies in Ireland, 
as in the UK, on a “comply or explain basis” for listed companies.  It 
provides that the decision as to whether a director is independent “in 
character and judgment” rests with the board which must decide whether 
there are “relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or 
                                                 
66 Rickford J “Corporate Governance in the UK, Company Law and Corporate 
Governance Code” in European Corporate Governance in Company Law and Codes, a 
Report prepared for the European Corporate Governance Conference of October 18, The 
Hague, The Netherlands.  
67 para.2.2.3 
68 2005/162/EC, Recital 4. 
69 Trubek, D., Cottrell, P. and Nance, M “ “Soft Law” “Hard Law” and European 
Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity” (2005) Legal Studies Research Papers Series 
Paper No.1002.  
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could appear to affect, the director’s judgment”. The Code is not sufficient 
to ensure a level playing field. Firstly, the Code may be avoided by a 
company merely explaining non-compliance or by adopting its own 
definition of the term “independent” or “conflict of interest.” Secondly, 
the Code is further weakened by the statement that it is up to the Board 
itself to determine what constitutes “independence.” Finally, the provision 
in the Code does not apply to specific decision making scenarios. It only 
applies to the general board position. What it refers to is independence 
from the company, not, for example, independence from a bidder. 
Although the EU Recommendation provides for periodic reconfirmation 
of independence, 70 it does not provide for reconfirmation on an issue by 
issue basis. For this reason, the guidelines pertaining to independence in 
the Code and Recommendation might be said to be merely illustrative.  
The Irish Takeover Rules states clearly that any director with a conflict of 
interest should be excluded from the formulation and communication of 
advice to shareholders.71 They provide furthermore that the nature of the 
conflict should be explained clearly to the shareholders in any document 
issued by the offeree.72 The City Code is less prescriptive merely stating in 
that directors with a conflict “should not normally be joined”.73 Even in 
such closely aligned Rules as those of the UK and Ireland and in countries 
with similar corporate cultures, it is clear thus that a disparity of treatment 
of directors is possible. The non-statutory Notes to the Irish Rules give 
three examples of circumstances in which a conflict will exit. 
Unfortunately, these are not necessarily consistent with the definitions in 
the Code. 74 For example, where the director will have an ongoing role in 
                                                 
70 Article 13.3.2.    
71 Rule 3.1. 
72 Rule 25.1(d). 
73 Note to Rule 25.1. 
74 “Board Advice During Takeovers” Conference “Soft Law, Soft Regulation? The 
Implications for Regulatory Practice”, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge (13th 
September 2006). 
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the new company the takeover rules are more likely to allow the director 
advise whereas under the Combined Code a material business relationship 
signifies a conflict. The existence of these differences may be positively 
unhelpful in the determination of independence in the context of a 
takeover Yet this is one of the consequences of operating within a hybrid 
system where hard and soft law operate in the same policy domain. The 
facets of soft law which appear to make it the appropriate form of 
regulation can also lead to significant difficulties in terms of application 
and enforcement. A study of the 39 offer documents reveals that while 
31% of directors declined to participate in the advisory team, 69% felt 
able to give advice to shareholders.  In 29% of the bids made, it was 
declared that at least some of the advisers would become part of the new 
board or become consultants to the newly acquired company. 75 In a 
further 29% of the bids, all advisers were expressly stated to have no 
further role. However, in the remaining 48% of cases, there was no 
disclosure at all as to the future role, if any of the directors.  In these cases, 
the shareholders did not have the benefit of this information in evaluating 
the advice. Clearly, hard rules would be difficult to formulate in relation to 
independent directors as in practice “one size does not fit all” and there are 
a myriad of different definitions of independence all with different 
criteria.76 It is submitted that a description of the nature of independence 
could have been set out clearly in the Directive and the relevant 
supervisory authorities rather than the board made the final arbiter of 
independence. (A somewhat similar treatment is given in the Directive to 
the definition of “concert party”.) As things stand, it appears that this 
aspect of corporate governance has fallen between two regulatory stools. 
This might be said to support a criticism which is often made of soft law 
                                                 
75 In four of these cases,  the majority of the advisers remained, in one an equal number 
remained, in five a minority remained (although often in an important role like CEO or 
financial director) and in one an unidentified minority remained. 
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that it undermines EU legitimacy because it creates expectations but does 
not or cannot bring about change.77   
 
VIII. REGULATORY COMPETITION 
Viewing takeover regulation through a regulatory lens leads to the 
question of whether the effectiveness of the mechanisms could be 
improved. As noted above, the Directive is a minimum standards directive 
which contains a number of substantive provisions which have been 
rendered optional as a result of the inclusion of Article 12(1). The 
European Council viewed Article 12(1) as necessary in order to take into 
account the existing differences in Member States’ company law 
mechanisms and structures. Yet its introduction has led to much 
controversy. Commissioner Bolkestein maintained that it would send the 
wrong message to the markets. The fact that it was officially reported that 
most Member States accepted the final text of the Directive on the basis of 
the Rapporteur’s view that “half a loaf is better than none” and the need to 
terminate “this never ending story”78 would not have allayed fears that this 
was merely an exercise in expediency. A more benign view was taken by 
Nilsen who welcomed the compromise as “a good solution which enables 
Member States with different types of market economies to preserve their 
unique comparative advantages, promoting a more competitive Europe as 
a whole”.79 The latter view forms part of a wider debate in the regulation 
of European company law concerning the merits of introducing 
                                                 
77 Trubek D, Cottrell P and Nance M “ “Soft Law” “Hard Law” and European 
Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity” (2005) Legal Studies Research Papers Series 
Paper No.1002. 
78 Lehne, K COD/2002/0240, EP: legislative opinion, 1st reading or single reading 
(16/12/2003), 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procnum=COD/2002/0240 
viewed 9 January 2006. 
79 Nilsen A, “The EU Takeover Directive and the Competitiveness of European 
Industry”, The Oxford Council on Good Governance Economy Analysis, No 1, p 3. 
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competition between national corporate law regimes.80 Regulatory 
competition implies that national legislatures compete to attract firms to 
operate subject to their laws.81 As Collins noted, “in the context of 
globalisation and regulatory competition between nation states, national 
governments need to be concerned that their laws governing commercial 
transactions do not put their economies at a competitive disadvantage, 
with the potential deleterious consequence of driving capital investment 
and business towards other jurisdictions.”82However, the process of 
legislative competition is often criticized as leading to “a race to the 
bottom”. In the US, the debate concerning the dynamics of regulatory 
competition is most often associated with the case of Delaware. The 
argument is often made that because shareholders have insufficient control 
over the decision to reincorporate, directors choose a jurisdiction such as 
Delaware which facilitates management entrenchment.83 However, the 
contrary argument is also made that directors would not engage in action 
perceived as detrimental to investors because of fears of a consequential 
negative reaction by the capital markets leading to an increase in the 
                                                 
80 McCahery J and Hertig G “An Agenda for Reform at p. 26 in Reforming Company and 
Takeover Law in Europe Ferrarini G, Hopt K, Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds). For an 
excellent description of the theories and varieties of regulatory competition see Deakin S 
“Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?” (2006) Centre 
for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No.323. 
81 Indeed Zumbansen argues that not only do governments compete but whole legal, 
social, political and economic cultures, their current states and their historical narratives 
compete. (Zumbansen, P, "Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to 
Regulatory Competition in European Company Law" (May 16, 2006). CLPE Research 
Paper No. 9/2006 p.37.) 
82 Collins, H at p.13  in Regulating Law, Parker  C, Scott C, Lacey N, Braithwaite J (eds, 
Oxford, 2004) 
83 Bebchuk L “Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law” (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1435,  Bebchuk, L and 
Hamdani, A "Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over 
Corporate Charters" (2002) 112 Yale Law Journal  553, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=325520 and Carey W “Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware” (1974) 83 Yale Law Journal 663.  
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company’s cost of capital. 84 It is said thus that market forces require 
directors to choose a beneficial regime and a “race to the top” ensues.85 
This brings benefits such as reduced costs, greater expertise and legal 
certainty. 86While lessons may be learned from the US, as Deakin pointed 
out the Delaware experience is unlikely to be repeated in the EU as the EU 
is on a different trajectory reflecting the particular conditions under which 
the national systems evolved and under which the harmonization 
programme developed.87 Although it was argued that there were 
substantive legal and procedural barriers to the establishment of regulatory 
competition between EU jurisdictions,88 as a consequence of a number of 
European Court of Justice decisions,89 regulatory competition now appears 
                                                 
84 See for example Winter R “ State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation” (1977) 6 J. Legal Studies 251 and Easterbrook F and Fischel D “Voting in 
Corporate Law” (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 395. 
85 Romano R “Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate 
Governance?” ECGI Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.26/2005. See also 
Heine K and Kerber W “European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path 
Dependence” (2002) 13 European Journal of Law and Economics 47. 
86 Romano R “Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle” (1985) 1 JL 
Econ & Org 225. See also Carney WJ “The Political Economy of Competition for 
Corporate Charters “ (1997) 26 Journal of Legal Studies 303. 
87 A detailed evolution of the EU company law harmonization programme is set out in 
McCahery, J and Vermeulen, E "The Changing Landscape of EU Company Law" 
(September 2004) TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP2004-023, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=871075. 
88 Scharpf F, Governing in Europe, Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press, 
1999) p.101. 
89 These include Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabssyrelsen [1999] 
ECR I-1459, Case C-208/00 Uberseering  BV v Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] ECR I-9919, Case C-167/01 Kamel van 
Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR I-10155. See 
Deakin S “Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?” 
(2006) 12 European Law Journal 440 for a discussion of the impact of the Centros case 
on regulatory competition in the EU.   
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more likely. A recent survey of international companies incorporating in 
the U.K. between 1997 and 2005 indicated a large increase in new 
incorporations of limited liability firms from EU Member States following 
these decisions.90 The study found that incorporation costs, in particular 
minimum capital requirements and delays in incorporation, are significant 
influences on location decisions. While many argue that effective 
competition takes place on the basis of differences in taxation, labour law 
and environmental law rather than company law,91major jurisdictions such 
as France and Germany have already instituted reforms to their corporate 
law regimes to stem the flow of firm migration particularly to the UK.92 
Will competition lead to a race to the bottom or to the top? Deakin 
identified “a reflexive approach” to EU corporate regulation which reflects 
the differences among Member States’ systems of corporate law in order 
to allow for mutual learning processes in the context of European 
lawmaking.93 In such a continuing process, the law is thus designed to 
underpin and encourage an autonomous processes of adjustment. Deakin 
explained that by placing limits on competition “harmonization may aim 
to preserve the autonomy and diversity of national legal systems, while at 
                                                 
90 Becht, Marco, Mayer, Colin and Wagner, Hannes F., "Where Do Firms Incorporate?" 
(October 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5875 available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=953820. The study found that that incorporation costs, in 
particular minimum capital requirements, and delays in incorporation are significant 
influences on firms' location decisions. 
91 Wymeersch, Eddy, "Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law" 
(October 1999). Financial Law Institute Working Paper 99-15. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=190431 and Ferran E, Company Law Reform in the UK, 
Working Paper  (2001) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=294508.  
92 Baums, Theodor, "Company Law Reform in Germany"3 J Corp Law Studies 181 
(2003)  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=329962 This reform involved the 
issuance of a Corporate Governance Code,  the introduction of  a "law on transparency 
and disclosure" (Transparenz- und Publizitatsgesetz) and the reform of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz). 
93 Deakin S “Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law” 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, Working Paper 163/2000. 
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the same time seeking to steer or channel the process of evolutionary 
adaptation of rules at state level”.94 Harmonisation may thus be seen as “a 
guarantor of diversity in the laws and practices of different Member 
States” and an encouragement of “innovation in forms of self regulation in 
the corporate sphere”.95 Forstinger described the process as one under 
which “[m]inimum standards are seeking to promote diverse, local-level 
approaches to regulatory problems by creating a space for autonomous 
solutions to emerge”.96Allowing more choice may thus encourage both EU 
and national lawmakers to design value-maximising provisions and, where 
there is adequate competition, to engage in innovative lawmaking.97 This 
may result in specialisation rather than convergence.98  
In the takeover context, Winter noted that the Directive clearly sets the 
benchmark of Articles 9 and 11 being applied by Member States and that 
hopefully market pressure would provide incentives to adopt this 
benchmark.99 However, Vermeulen questioned the likelihood of market-
                                                 
94 Deakin S “Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law” 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, Working Paper 163/2000 at p.31. 
95 Deakin S “Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law” 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, Working Paper 163/2000 at p.41. 
96 Forstinger C, Takeover Law in the EU and USA: A Comparative Analysis (Kluwer 
Law International, 2002) at 159  
97 An Agenda for Reform at P.38 in Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, 
G Ferrarrini, K Hopt, J Winter and E Wymeersch (eds) and Hertig G and McCahery J 
“Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization Efforts or 
Regulatory Competition?” ECGI Law Working Paper 12/2003 at p.4. 
98 Armour, John, "Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory 
Competition" Current Legal Problems, Vol. 48, 2005 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=757205. 
99 Winter J, “EU Company Law at the Cross-Roads” in Reforming Company and 
Takeover Law in Europe, Ferrarini G, Hopt K, Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds), p 18.  
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induced reform as a result of the strong coalition of interest groups and 
other path-dependent forces.100 When the Winter Committee originally 
considered whether enforcement of the shareholder decision-making 
principle and the proportionality principle might be left to market forces, it 
agreed that this might be possible in a fully integrated and well developed 
securities market. Such a market would be able to judge correctly the cost 
of capital of companies with capital and control structures which deviate 
from these principles and alternative investments would be available to 
investors. However, the Winter Committee acknowledged that the conflict 
of interest of the board might lead to market failure in the principle of 
shareholder decision-making. Secondly, it acknowledged that efficient 
markets do not exist across Europe. It opined that the securities markets in 
Member States differ widely in levels of development and in most 
Member States, they would not be able efficiently to judge companies 
which do and do not adhere to these two principles. The Winter Report 
stated that the more and less developed markets must be integrated on a 
European level to enable the restructuring of European industry and the 
integration of European securities markets to proceed with reasonable 
efficiency and speed. It also noted that investor protection tends to be 
weaker in markets where the two principles are not generally followed. 
Consequently, in order to establish securities markets in the European 
Union which are both efficient and provide an adequate level of investor 
protection, the Winter Committee advised that the two principles must be 
specified in more detailed rules which are binding in the Member 
States.101 Whether the European Parliament’s failure to do so impedes the 
ultimate attainment of the Directive’s objectives as the Winter Committee 
predicted or whether the balance struck in the Directive between 
regulatory competition and harmonization will lead to more efficient 
marketplaces remains to be seen. Certainly, the adoption by the majority 
of Member States of Article 9 suggests the latter.  
                                                 
100 Vermeulen, Erik, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United 
States (Kluwer Law International, 2003). 
101 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to 
Takeover Bids, p.22-23. 
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Finally, it should be acknowledged that a new concept in EU company law 
was introduced into the regulatory competition debate in the Directive – 
reciprocity. Article 12(3) allows Member States “to exempt companies 
which apply” the Articles “if they become the subject of an offer launched 
by a company which does not apply the same Articles as they do” or a 
company controlled by such a company. To do so, however, Article 12(5) 
provides that they need the authorisation of their shareholders at a meeting 
granted no more than 18 months before the bid. The concept of reciprocity 
seeks to encourage companies to move to a more liberal regime 
voluntarily by allowing them the benefit of such a regime where they are 
the offeror in a takeover bid. It is also notable that the provision was 
introduced in the context of concerns that the Directive would not create a 
level playing field between the EU and the United States. It was felt that 
the Directive would restrict EU companies defending themselves against 
bids in circumstances where their United States counterparts might not be 
so limited.102 The inclusion of a reciprocity provision runs contrary to the 
idea that the location or openness to takeover of the offeror is irrelevant 
and that what should be considered is the location of the offeree. It is 
argued that reciprocity in takeovers unduly restricts the group of potential 
offerors to listed companies that are themselves open to hostile bids 
creating a “fortress Europe” vista and that it reduces the potential benefits 
of contestable control.103 From a theoretical perspective, this limitation is 
in conflict with the declared aim of protecting the minority shareholders of 
the offeree. As the empirical evidence suggests that multiple offerors are 
associated with higher premiums for offeree shareholders, reciprocity is 
likely to penalise the minority shareholders the Directive seeks to protect 
in circumstances where it not essential in addressing fairness concerns. In 
addition, it may be difficult to reconcile this provision with the freedom of 
                                                 
102 Ironically, a convincing argument can be made that the reciprocity provision does not 
apply to companies from third countries. It could be said that such companies are not in a 
position to “apply” the same Articles and are thus not caught. An alternative view, and 
one which the Commission appears to take is that each offeror must be examined on a 
case-by-case basis to determine whether its own articles of association allow defensive 
actions or break-through. This rather than the state of incorporation is the relevant 
determinant of the applicability of Art 12(3). 
103 Becht  M, “Reciprocity in Takeovers”ECGI – Law Working Paper No 14/2003.  
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establishment and free movement of capital under EU law which do not 
impose any condition on the party wishing to enjoy rights under national 
company laws other than having the registered office or central 
administration in a Member State.104 In allowing national discrimination, 
it may also be contrary to the “Most Favoured Nation” principle. The 
majority of Member States including Ireland and the UK have chosen not 
to adopt this Article. What is likely, however, is that the first company in a 
Member State allowing it that seeks to take advantage of it in the context 
of a hostile bid will be the subject of legal challenge in the European Court 
of Justice. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Commissioner Bolkestein criticised the final draft of the Directive stating 
that he was not going to “[pretend] that the version of the Directive agreed 
today represents a step forward for EU competitiveness or for the 
integration of EU capital markets”.105 The Chairman of the London Panel 
Peter Scott was equally negative stating that the Directive “is hardly a 
triumph for harmonisation since the contentious areas remain a matter for 
Member States to decide for themselves.” Whether this could have been 
avoided is a moot point and as noted above benefits may well be derived 
from the ensuing regulatory competition. The Directive has also been seen 
to be the source of a number of new problems for Member States already 
in possession of the minimum standards. For the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, the Directive brings little in the form of additional safeguards or 
benefits to an already robust and effective system. The UK Government 
and the London Panel have expressly stated that the Directive will not 
yield any significant improvement to the principles or methods by which 
takeovers and mergers are conducted in the United Kingdom under the 
City Code.106 The UK Government also recognised that the Directive 
                                                 
104 Winter J “EU Company Law at the Crossroads” at p.12 in Reforming Company and 
Takeover Law in Europe (Ferrarrini,G Hopt, K Winter J and Wymeersch E (eds) (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) pp 18-19. 
105 Press Release MEMO/03/245. 
106 London Takeover Panel, 2004 Annual Report , p. 8.  
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might give rise to “an increased risk of litigation within the bid process, 
which could have the effect of delaying or frustrating a takeover bid and 
hindering the opportunity for shareholders to decide upon its merits.”107 It 
is difficult to argue that his unequal exchange can result from an efficient 
regulatory approach. While this might seem at first glance merely one 
State’s problem, the prominence of the UK securities market and takeover 
market make this a more significant general concern. Supervisory 
authorities also face new challenges in interpreting certain of the 
Directive’s more opaque provisions. As the paper has shown, in many 
cases this will lead to uncertainty, delays in timetables and increased 
litigation. Finally, the Directive can also be criticized for its failure to 
tackle certain issues which though dismissed as corporate governance 
matters have a real impact on the likelihood of bids being made and 
accepted. 
On a more positive note, the Directive might be viewed as a step forward 
through laying down minimum standards for takeover regulation and 
applying many of the core values of the UK system at the EU level.108 It 
might be said “to put a floor to the race to the bottom”.109 The UK 
Government acknowledged that it opened up the prospect of “improved 
shareholder protection and access to capital markets across Europe and a 
potential stimulus for more transparent corporate governance structures 
with extended shareholder involvement.”110 If implemented in accordance 
with its own General Principles, it could encourage cross-border takeover 
                                                 
107 DTI, Company Law Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids, A 
Consultative Document (January 2005) para 1.8. 
108 Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State, Foreword DTI, Company Law Implementation of 
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activity with consequential improvements in corporate management.111 
This clearly would be in the public interest. For new accession States, 
perhaps it could be argued that the Directive gives guidance and provides 
a useful structure on which to build national takeover regulatory systems 
appropriate for the EU market. However, it should be noted that a 
Directive might not have been necessary to provide this. For example, 
both Ireland and Austria successfully introduced national takeover 
regulations based very heavily on the City Code and with the advice of the 
London Panel. Enriques cites this as a general complaint against EU 
company law - that often when it has introduced new rules, it has done so 
with respect to issues on which Member States would have most probably 





                                                 
111 DTI Partial Regulatory Impact Assessment (2005) at [10]. 
